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We investigate the effects of a range of different types of anchor on WTP and WTA valua-
tions of familiar consumer products, elicited through individuals’ buying or selling deci-
sions at given prices. We ﬁnd anchoring effects only when the anchor value is framed as
a plausible price for the good for which the individual is a potential buyer or seller. Anchor-
ing effects are stronger for WTA than for WTP. We conclude that anchoring effects can
affect market behaviour, but that not all anchors are effective.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
There is now a substantial body of experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis that individuals’ reported valuations
of goods can be affected by anchors – that is, non-informative numerical cues (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003;
Mazar, Koszegi, & Ariely, 2010; Tufano, 2010; Alevy, Landry, & List, 2011; Fudenberg, Levine, & Maniadis, 2012). In a typical
experiment, each subject is ﬁrst asked whether she would buy (or sell) a speciﬁc good at a stated price that is clearly arbi-
trary, and then is asked to state her maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) or minimum willingness-to-accept (WTA) for that
good; the usual ﬁnding is that valuations are positively correlated with the arbitrary ‘anchor’ price. Taken at face value, these
ﬁndings may have important implications for the efﬁciency of retail markets, for two reasons. First, if individuals’ purchasing
decisions can be inﬂuenced by irrelevant anchors, ﬁrms may be able to use related mechanisms to manipulate those deci-
sions to the detriment of consumers. Second, many policies aimed at ensuring the competitiveness of retail markets rely on
consumers’ ability to ﬁnd the lowest prices; the existence of anchoring effects raises doubts about the effectiveness of this
mechanism.
However, most of the evidence of anchoring effects on economic valuations has been derived from a narrow class of
experimental designs which may not be representative of real-world interactions between ﬁrms and consumers. With a
22 R. Sugden et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013) 21–31few exceptions, these experiments have investigated only one type of anchor, and this type may not be the best model of the
opportunities for manipulation that are open to ﬁrms. Theory and evidence from psychology suggest that anchoring effects –
and hence the scope for failures of price competition – might be much more general than those on which economists have
focused. Furthermore, most experiments have used an ‘open-ended’ method of eliciting valuations which is not typical of
retail markets and which may be particularly susceptible to anchoring effects.
In this paper we report an experiment which investigates the effects of a range of different types of anchor on WTP and
WTA valuations, elicited through individuals’ buying or selling decisions at given prices. A further feature of our experiment
is that it allows us to compare the strength of anchoring effects on buyers and sellers. Since consumers act as buyers in most
retail markets, differences between the susceptibility of buyers and sellers to anchoring effects are relevant in assessing the
impact of these effects on competition and consumer welfare. To date, there have been few such direct comparisons, and
these have generated conﬂicting results.
Section 2 reviews the existing evidence of anchoring effects on economic valuations, drawing attention to some of its
limitations. Section 3 identiﬁes four dimensions on which anchors can vary, and discusses theoretical reasons for expect-
ing variation along these dimensions to affect the strength of anchoring effects. Section 4 describes the experimental
design we use to investigate these forms of variation. Our results are presented in Section 5. Their implications are dis-
cussed in Section 6.2. Anchoring effects for valuations: existing evidence
The hypothesis that judgements can be subject to anchoring effects was proposed by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) as an
explanation of ‘preference reversal’ between choices and relative valuations. It was later used by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) in a more general account of heuristics and biases in judgements under uncertainty. (Viewed in a psychological per-
spective, valuation is a special case of judgement.) The ﬁrst direct experimental investigation of anchoring effects on valu-
ations of commodities was by Johnson and Schkade (1989), who studied the effects of anchors on certainty-equivalent
valuations of lotteries. That experiment was not incentivized, but in other respects it pioneered what is now the most
widely-used experimental design for investigating anchoring effects on valuations.
This canonical design has been used in relation to both WTP and WTA; for simplicity, we will describe the WTP version.
Each subject ﬁrst faces an anchoring task in which she is asked whether she would buy a speciﬁc commodity at a stated price.
Usually, this price is ﬁxed by some mechanism that is clearly arbitrary (for example, it is constructed from the digits of the
subject’s social security number, or set by a random device), but in some experiments the price is simply stated with no
explanation of its origin. The subject then faces a valuation task which elicits the highest price at which she would buy
the same commodity. Usually the elicitation mechanism is open-ended (i.e. the subject simply states her highest price),
but sometimes it uses multiple binary choice (i.e. the subject states whether she would buy at each of a set of alternative
prices, and her WTP valuation is inferred from those choices). The valuation task is incentivized, either by the Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism or by treating subjects’ responses as bids in a Vickrey auction. Usually, but not
always, the anchoring task is also incentivized. This design has been used with many different commodities, including stan-
dard consumer products, lotteries, sportscards, and unpleasant sounds and tastes (e.g., Ariely et al., 2003; Bateman, Munro,
Rhodes, Starmer, & Sugden, 2006; Bergman, Ellingsen, Johannesson, & Svensson, 2010; Mazar et al., 2010; Tufano, 2010;
Alevy et al., 2011; Fudenberg et al., 2012). Many but not all implementations of the canonical design have found signiﬁcant
positive relationships between reported valuations and anchor prices (the experiments of Bateman et al., Tufano, and
Fudenberg et al. are exceptions).
In a variant design, the anchor is framed as a price expectation. In an experiment reported by Isoni, Brooks, Loomes, and
Sugden (2011), the valuation task is incentivized by a median-price Vickrey auction; the anchoring task asks subjects to pre-
dict the price that will emerge in this auction, and different questionnaire designs are used to prompt high or low predic-
tions. Mazar et al. (2010) report an experiment in which the anchoring manipulation is to tell subjects the distribution of
prices that will be used in the BDM mechanism that incentivizes the valuation task; left-skewed and right-skewed distribu-
tions respectively generate low and high price expectations. Both experiments ﬁnd signiﬁcant anchoring effects. Anchoring
effects induced by the manipulation of price expectations are closely related to shaping effects – the tendency for bids and
asks in repeated incentive-compatible auctions to be positively correlated with previously-observed prices (Loomes, Starm-
er, & Sugden, 2003; Tufano, 2010; Isoni et al., 2011).
A few studies have investigated factors which might inﬂuence the strength of anchoring effects. It has been found that
anchoring effects are weaker for individuals with higher cognitive ability (Bergman et al., 2010) and for individuals with
more experience of trading the relevant good (Alevy et al., 2011). Mazar et al. (2010) ﬁnd that anchoring is stronger when
the elicitation method is open-ended than when it uses multiple binary choice. However, there has been little systematic
investigation of the relative strength of the effects of different types of anchors on incentivized valuations. Almost all of
the existing evidence comes from experiments in which the anchor was a price (or an expectation of a price) for the same
commodity that appears in the valuation task, though Ariely et al. (2003, Experiment 5) ﬁnd that anchor tasks relating to one
type of unpleasant noise inﬂuence subjects’ WTA for experiencing other types. In contrast, psychologists investigating
judgement tasks in general have considered many other types of anchor, at least some of which are potentially relevant
in economic contexts.
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are elicited from buyers or sellers. Simonson and Drolet (2004, Study 1) report a non-incentivized experiment in which
anchoring effects were stronger in buying tasks. Fudenberg et al. (2012) use a design that allows comparisons between
buying and selling. In almost all the cases they investigate, anchoring effects are not signiﬁcant, but the summary sta-
tistics suggest (contrary to Simonson and Drolet’s ﬁndings) that if anchoring does occur, its effects are stronger in selling
tasks.3. Anchoring effects for valuations: issues to be investigated
Our experiment was designed to investigate, in incentivized valuation tasks, the relative strengths of anchoring effects for
different types of anchor, and between buying and selling tasks. We focus on four speciﬁc dimensions of anchoring: the plau-
sibility of anchor values, the relevance of the anchor task to the valuation task, the subject’s engagement in the anchoring task,
and whether the valuation task was one of buying or selling. In this Section, we consider theoretical arguments from psychol-
ogy and economics concerning the effects of variation along these dimensions. We must emphasise, however, that it is not
the purpose of our experiment to discriminate between the theories we will discuss. With respect to the issues we are inves-
tigating, the predictions of those theories often overlap.
3.1. Plausibility
It is natural to ask whether anchors are more effective, the more plausible they are as answers to the corresponding
judgement tasks. One reason for thinking that this might be the case is provided by the hypothesis that experimental sub-
jects are inﬂuenced by the conversational norms that apply in ordinary social situations and by the inferences that those
norms license (Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1994). Consciously or unconsciously, subjects may assume that the experimenter
would not have presented an anchor unless it was informative, and so treat it as such. Thus, for example, the anchor question
‘Would you buy good A at price £x?’ is interpreted as implying that £x is a normal or reasonable price for A. It seems unlikely
that that inference would be made if the supposition of an £x price was wholly implausible.
A related mechanism is implied by the hypothesis of bad-deal aversion (Thaler, 1985; Isoni, 2011). An individual who is
bad-deal averse uses prices as reference points, and derives disutility (respectively: utility) from trading at prices that are
less (more) favourable to her than those reference points. Preferences of this kind induce anchoring effects if anchors are
treated as reference prices for the good used in the valuation task. One might expect this mechanism to depend on the plau-
sibility of the anchor price.
A different reason for expecting more plausible anchors to have stronger effects is offered by the psychological theory
of selective accessibility (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). This theory proposes that an anchor task
activates items of knowledge that are relevant for that task; if immediately afterwards the subject faces a judgement
task, those items are particularly accessible and so have a disproportionate effect on her response. A similar hypothesis
was previously proposed by Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) to explain the observation that responses to dichotomous
judgement tasks (e.g., ‘Is the height of Mount Everest more than 10,000 metres?’) are biased by the anchors provided
by those tasks (10,000 m in the example). One apparent implication is that the more obvious the answer to the anchor
task is, and so the less need there is to access knowledge in answering it, the less effect the anchor will have on
the subsequent valuation task. Thus, implausibly high or implausibly low anchor prices should have relatively weak
effects.
3.2. Relevance
In the canonical design, the anchoring task requires the subject to consider an arbitrary buying or selling price for the
same commodity as is featured in the valuation task. An obvious question is whether this condition is necessary for anchor-
ing effects to occur or, more generally, whether the strength of anchoring effects is affected by the relevance of the anchor
task to the valuation task.
The explanations of anchoring considered in the previous subsection also provide reasons why anchoring effects should
be stronger when anchors are more relevant. If the anchor question is about buying good A at a price of £x but the valuation
task is about WTP for good B, conversational norms do not give obvious support to the inference that £x is a normal, reason-
able or reference price for good B. If this inference is not made, bad-deal aversion also does not come into play. The selective
accessibility hypothesis implies that the strength of anchoring effects will depend on the degree of overlap between
the knowledge requirements of the anchor and valuation tasks. Thus, one might expect anchoring effects to be stronger,
the greater the relevance of the anchoring task to the judgement task.
However, some striking evidence suggesting that wholly irrelevant cues can work as anchors comes from the basic
anchoring effects reported by Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996). In a typical design, the anchoring task requires
student subjects to copy ﬁve pages of numbers (framed as a handwriting test); they are then asked to make judgements
about the number of fellow-students who will get cancer in the near future. Subjects who have copied larger numbers
tend to give larger numbers as judgements. Wilson et al. speculate that this effect may be due to backward priming: the
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memory, even if unrelated to the task at hand, are then retrieved. A similar hypothesis was earlier proposed by Slovic
and Lichtenstein (1968) as an explanation of anchoring effects in preference reversal tasks; Slovic and Lichtenstein’s
hypothesis is that the money value of the prize in a lottery acts as an anchor for a task which elicits a valuation of that
lottery.3.3. Engagement
The selective accessibility and backward priming hypotheses explain anchoring as a side-effect of psychological processes
for storing and retrieving items in memory. In the performance of the anchor task, particular pieces of knowledge are ac-
cessed, or particular numbers are stored in short-term memory. These items are then selectively retrieved in the valuation
task. So, if either of these hypotheses were correct, it would be natural to expect the strength of anchoring effects to depend
on the extent of the subject’s engagement with the anchor task (Wilson et al., 1996).
For example, if incentivization of a task increases subjects’ engagement with it, memories associated with the anchor
task might be more retrievable in designs in which that task is incentivized. Another possibility is that the memory of
the anchor value might be more retrievable, the more the subject had been involved in the process (however arbitrary)
in which that value was determined. For example, a subject has more mental engagement with an anchor value that she
is required to construct from certain digits of her social security number than with one that is simply stated by the
experimenter.3.4. Buying or selling
The possibility of anchoring effects seems to depend on some degree of imprecision in subjects’ ‘true’ valuations. One
might therefore conjecture that anchoring effects would be weaker, the more experience subjects had had in making judge-
ments similar to those elicited in the valuation task. Most people have much more experience of buying low-value consumer
goods, such as those used in our experiment, than of selling them. Thus, a typical subject comes to the laboratory with a
ﬁrmer sense of how to respond to given prices when acting as a buyer than when acting as a seller; as a result, WTP might
be subject to less imprecision than is WTA, and less susceptible to the effects of arbitrary cues.
The results reported by Simonson and Drolet (2004, Study 1), referred to in Section 2, may seem to provide evidence
against this conjecture. However, the framing of Simonson and Drolet’s non-incentivizedWTA task asked subjects ‘to assume
that they had received new products as gifts and had decided to sell them’. Since this frame suggests that the products are
unwanted and that the subject has already decided to dispose of them, it seems unlikely to induce the sense of endowment
typical of incentivizedWTA tasks (which may explain the very unusual result that WTA was less thanWTP). If the subject can
assume that the products are unwanted, she has no need to consider what they are ‘really’ worth to her, and so the problem
of preference imprecision does not arise.4. Experimental design
4.1. Overview
The experiment had separate buying and selling treatments, faced by different subjects. The buying treatment elicited
WTP valuations for a range of consumption goods and lotteries (the trading commodities); the selling treatment elicited
WTA valuations for the same commodities. In each treatment, each subject faced eleven tasks in random order, presented
on a computer screen. Ten of these tasks had the two-part structure of the canonical design. The ﬁrst part of such a task
was a question that was framed to provide a potential anchor value. Different tasks used different types of anchor, differen-
tiated in terms of plausibility, relevance and engagement. The eleventh task, used as a control, differed from the others in
that its ﬁrst part was a ‘ﬁller’ question with no anchoring signiﬁcance. The second part of each task elicited the relevant
valuation.
The ten non-control tasks faced by any given subject can be grouped into ﬁve pairs. (This pairing was not described
explicitly to subjects; because of randomization, the two tasks in a pair were usually not adjacent to one another.) In any
given pair, the two tasks were identical except that one task provided a relatively low anchor value while the other provided
a relatively high one. Thus, our design allows within-subject tests of the existence and size of anchoring effects, in both buy-
ing and selling, for each anchor type.
Because we wanted to investigate more than ﬁve anchor types but did not want to overload subjects or make the exper-
iment last too long, the subjects in each treatment (i.e. buying and selling) were randomly divided into two groups, A and B.
These groups faced different (but overlapping) sets of tasks, involving nine anchor types in all (in addition to the control
task). To minimise learning and across-tasks effects, and to ensure that our results were not dependent on the use of any
speciﬁc commodity, we used six different trading commodities, each with a market value of approximately £5. Each subject’s
eleven tasks involved all six commodities (one for each pair of non-control tasks and one for the control task.) To ensure that
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anchor types and commodities were counterbalanced.
Because each subject faced eleven tasks rather than just one, we were able to collect a rich body of data and to use within-
subject tests. The downside of this design strategy is that the anchor used in one task might inﬂuence the valuations reported
by subjects in later tasks. If such contamination were to occur, it would add noise to the data. However, because the order of
tasks was randomized, it would not impart systematic biases to our tests.
4.2. Anchor types
The ﬁrst part of each non-control task was a comparative question relating to an anchor commodity. Depending on the an-
chor type, this might or might not be the same as the trading commodity. Using A to denote the anchor commodity and £x to
denote an amount of money, the comparative question took the form ‘If you had A, would you sell your A if we offered you
£x?’ (in the selling mode) or ‘If you had £12, would you buy A if you had to pay £x?’ (in the buying mode). Thus, the subject
was prompted to focus on the anchor value x. In the control task, the comparative question ‘Do you like dogs more than cats?’
was used as a ﬁller. We will say that the control task had the no lab anchor type. (We use this term to signal that the ‘anchor
value’ provided by the experiment is not the only value that a subject might retrieve from memory when reporting her val-
uation of the trading commodity.)
The anchor types used in the experiment, and the subject groups to which they were assigned, are described in
Table 1. The ﬁrst row of this table describes the baseline anchor type, which is similar to that of the canonical design.
When this anchor type was used, the subject’s ﬁrst exposure to the anchor value was when it appeared in the compar-
ative question (indicated by ‘none’ in the ‘process to set anchor value’ column). The anchor commodity was the same as
the trading commodity. The low anchor value was drawn at random from the interval from £1 to £2; the high anchor
value was drawn at random from the interval from £10 to £12. High and low anchor values were both intended to be
perceived as plausible prices or valuations. The baseline comparative question was not incentivized. This was for reasons
of external validity. Outside the lab, an anchoring manipulation is typically a way of framing a given decision problem
(as when a supermarket prices a product at £6.95, with the label ‘Special offer! Normal price £9.95’); the frame does not
have an incentive structure independent of that problem. The entry in the ﬁnal column indicates that the baseline
anchor type was faced by both subject groups. By making two anchor types common to both groups, we were able
to check that the randomization was effective and that the particular assignment of anchor types to groups was not
inducing systematic effects. In fact, there was no signiﬁcant difference in WTA or WTP valuations for the common tasks
between the two groups.
The other anchor types differed from the baseline in the following ways.
The implausible price anchor type was used to investigate the effect of variation along the dimension of plausibility. In this
anchor type, the low anchor value was £0.01 and the high anchor value was £1000. We assumed that such extreme values
would not be perceived as providing information about (or reference points for) responses to the trading questions in part 2.
The similar good and dissimilar good anchor types were used to investigate the effect of variation along the dimension of
relevance. In these anchor types, the anchor commodity was not the same as the trading commodity, but was approximately
equal in market value. In the similar good case, the two goods were chosen so that individuals’ ‘true’ valuations of the com-
modities were likely to be positively correlated. In the dissimilar good case, the two commodities were unrelated to one an-
other (see Section 4.4).
The incentivized anchor type was used to investigate the effect of one form of engagement. In this anchor type, the com-
parative question was incentivized in the same way as the trading questions (see Section 4.5).
The ﬁnal four non-control anchor types were used to investigate a different form of engagement – involvement in the
determination of the anchor value. In each of these anchor types, the comparative task was preceded by a matrix problem,
whose solution determined the anchor value. In the two price search anchor types, the subject was shown an 8  8 matrix
of monetary values, described as ‘prices’. These values were determined randomly, subject to the constraint that the lowest
value was in the range from £1 to £2 (for low anchor tasks) or from £10 to £12 (for high anchor tasks). In the two number
search anchor types, the only difference was that the entries in the matrix were dimensionless numbers. (Thus, for example,
the ‘number’ 1.45 was shown instead of the ‘price’ £1.45.) In the two active anchor types, the subject was asked to ﬁnd the
lowest price (or number) in the matrix and to type it into a blank space on the screen. (If the response was incorrect, the
subject was prompted to try again.) This (or the corresponding) price then became the anchor value for the comparative
question.
The ﬁnal row of Table 1 describes the no lab anchor control, which was faced by both subject groups.
4.3. The elicitation of WTA and WTP
The second part of each task began with a screen telling the subject ‘You are endowed with T and you have an oppor-
tunity to sell T’ (in the selling mode) or ‘You are endowed with £12 and you have an opportunity to buy T’ (in the buy-
ing context). Here T denotes the name of the trading commodity. The subject was then asked to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to
each of 25 trading questions of the form ‘If I am offered £y for T, I will sell’ (in the selling mode) or ‘If the price of T is £y,
I will buy’. The trading questions used 25 different prices: y = 0.01, 0.50, 1.00, 1.50, . . .12.00. Thus, a subject’s responses
Table 1
Anchor types.
Anchor type Process to set
anchor value
Relation of anchor commodity
to trading commodity
Low anchor
value
High anchor
value
Incentives Subject groups
facing task
Baseline None Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No A and B
Implausible price None Same £0.01 £1000 No A
Similar good None Similar £1–£2 £10–£12 No A
Dissimilar good None Dissimilar £1–£2 £10–£12 No B
Incentivized None Same £1–£2 £10–£12 Yes B
Passive number search Computer ﬁnds number Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No A
Passive price search Computer ﬁnds price Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No B
Active number search Subject ﬁnds number Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No B
Active price search Subject ﬁnds price Same £1–£2 £10–£12 No A
No lab anchor N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A A and B
26 R. Sugden et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013) 21–31to these questions located her WTA or WTP within a £0.50 band (or revealed that valuation to be less than £0.01 or
greater than £12.00).1
Notice that this design elicits valuations by multiple binary choices rather than by a single open-ended question. We used
this elicitation method for three reasons. First, ‘Would you pay £x for T?’ is cognitively simpler than ‘What is the highest
price you would pay for T?’ and so less likely to induce confusion. Second, the multiple binary choice format can be linked
to the BDM mechanism by telling subjects that one binary choice will be selected at random to be ‘real’. This presentation
makes the incentive-compatibility of the mechanism more transparent than when valuations are open-ended. Third, most
retail transactions take place at take-it-or-leave-it prices; cases (such as sealed-bid auctions) in which consumers record
open-ended valuations or bids are much rarer. Thus, in the context of retail markets, the multiple binary choice format
has greater external validity.
As we noted in Section 2, there is some evidence that anchoring effects are weaker when valuations are elicited by
binary choices. One possible explanation is that the greater transparency of this method allows subjects to be more con-
ﬁdent in their responses and so less susceptible to irrelevant cues. An alternative explanation is compatible with the
hypothesis of backward priming. Binary choice questions require yes/no answers while open-ended valuation questions
require numerical answers. Thus, numbers in memory are more likely to be accessed when subjects are dealing with
open-ended questions.
4.4. Trading and anchor commodities
Six different trading commodities were used in the experiment: a lottery in which all the prizes were positive, which we
called a ‘win–win gamble’; ﬁve National Lottery scratch cards; two bottles of Chinese sauce; a box of chocolates; a bath to-
wel; and a luxury pen. The win–win gamble gave the prizes £15.53, £3.08 and £0.01 with probabilities 0.3, 0.5 and 0.2,
respectively; its expected value was £6.20. The other commodities had market prices in the range from £4.50 to £5.10. (Mul-
tiple items, such as ﬁve scratch cards, are treated as a single commodity.) In the ‘similar good’ tasks, the corresponding an-
chor commodities were respectively: a different win–win gamble with approximately the same expected value; ﬁve
National Lottery scratch cards of a different type; three bottles of Thai sauce; a box of a different type of chocolates produced
by the same ﬁrm; ﬁve face cloths; and a different type of pen. In the ‘dissimilar good’ tasks, the anchor commodity was an
iTune coupon.
4.5. Incentives
At the end of the experiment the computer picked one of the eleven tasks at random. If the anchor type of that task was
not ‘incentivized’, the computer then picked one of the 25 trading questions for that task. What the subject took away from
the experiment was determined by her response to that task. In a selling task, if the subject had declared her willingness to
sell the trading commodity at the £x price of the relevant trading question, she received £x; otherwise, she received the com-
modity. In a buying task, if the subject had declared her willingness to buy at the £x price, she received the commodity and
£(12  x); otherwise, she received £12. If the subject received a win–win gamble, it was resolved by the computer, using a
random-number generator. If the anchor type of the task picked was ‘incentivized’, the computer then randomly picked
either the ﬁrst or second part of that task. Depending on which part was picked, the subject’s earnings were determined
either by her response to the comparative question or by her response to one of the 25 trading questions.1 The software was designed so that the subject did not need to click ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to every question. For example, in the selling mode, if a subject clicked ‘yes’
(respectively ‘no’) to an offer of x, ‘yes’ (‘no’) was automatically entered for every offer greater than (less than) x. Thus only two clicks were needed to answer all
25 questions. This procedure prevented subjects from making inconsistent responses.
Table 2
WTA and WTP means and standard errors.
No lab anchor Low anchor High anchor
WTA 5.01 4.91 5.43
(0.31) (0.23) (0.25)
WTP 1.62 1.45 1.56
(0.18) (0.11) (0.12)
Note: 108 observations for WTA, 120 observations for WTP. Valuations are in £. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
Table 3
WTA and WTP means and standard errors by commodity.
Commodity WTA WTP
Low anchor
(90 observations)
High anchor
(90 observations)
Low anchor
(100 observations)
High anchor
(100 observations)
Win–win gamble 5.91 6.30 2.15 2.22
(0.31) (0.34) (0.22) (0.21)
Two bottles of 3.82 4.51 0.82 0.98
Chinese sauce (0.30) (0.34) (0.11) (0.12)
Box of chocolate 5.56 6.19 1.58 1.76
(0.31) (0.32) (0.14) (0.16)
Towel 4.84 5.24 1.57 1.61
(0.30) (0.31) (0.19) (0.20)
Pen 3.37 3.95 0.54 0.58
(0.31) (0.35) (0.08) (0.10)
Five National Lottery scratch cards 5.96 6.41 2.04 2.19
(0.34) (0.35) (0.21) (0.23)
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
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5.1. Summary statistics and aggregated tests
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) Laboratory at the
University of East Anglia in Spring 2011. Subjects were recruited using a campus-wide online system. There were 228 sub-
jects, 108 in the selling treatment and 120 in the buying treatment. Most of the subjects were students, from a wide range of
academic disciplines and with an age range from 19 to 47. The experiment lasted around 45 min with an average payment of
£10.73 per person, in addition to commodities that subjects took away from the experiment.
Table 2 reports means and standard errors of WTA and WTP, averaging over all anchor types and all commodities, broken
down according to whether there was no lab anchor, a low value anchor or a high value anchor.2 In calculating standard er-
rors, we treat subjects as the units of observation; for each subject, we observe the mean of WTA or WTP across the relevant
tasks. Recall that each subject reported ﬁve ‘low anchor’ and ﬁve ‘high anchor’ valuations, but only one ‘no lab anchor’ valuation.
Thus, there is more noise in the data for ‘no lab anchor’ data than in those for high or low anchors.
In both selling and buying contexts, high-anchor valuations are greater than low-anchor valuations. The relative (and still
more, the absolute) magnitude of the anchoring effect is greater in the selling context, where high-anchor valuations are 11
per cent greater than low-anchor valuations, than in the buying context, where the corresponding measure is 7 per cent. To
test for the signiﬁcance of these differences, we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, applied to ‘observations’ as deﬁned above.
(Throughout the paper, all within-subject tests are of this type. For between-subject comparisons we use Mann–Whitney
tests.) In both cases, the anchoring effect is signiﬁcant (z = 5.279, p < 0.001 for WTA, z = 2.024, p = 0.043 for WTP).
In the selling context, mean low-anchor and high-anchor WTA (£4.91 and £5.43, respectively) are well above the range of
low anchor values (the highest of which was £2) and well below the range of high anchor values (the lowest of which was
£10). The implication is that, in general, WTA was pulled up by high anchors and/or pulled down by low anchors. This is
consistent with the observation that the mean of ‘no lab anchor’ WTA (£5.01) lies between the high- and low-anchor means.2 A subject’s WTA is recorded as the highest value of x at which she answered ‘Yes’ to the question asking if she would sell at the price £x. A subject’s WTP is
recorded as the lowest value of x at which she answered ‘No’ to the question asking if she would buy at the price £x. If a subject was not willing to sell (was
willing to buy) at the highest price of £12, her WTA (WTP) is recorded as £12.50. In fact, there were only 7 (out of a possible 1188) observations of WTA greater
than £12.00, and no observations of WTP greater than £12.00. If a subject was not willing to sell (was willing to buy) at the lowest price of £0.01, her WTA
(WTP) is recorded as £0.00. Notice that, because of these conventions, our measures of WTA and WTP are not directly comparable. (For example, a subject
whose minimum selling price is £9.75 is recorded as having a WTA of £10, while a subject whose maximum buying price is £9.75 is recorded as having a WTP of
£9.50.) However, our focus is on the differential effects of low and high anchor values, holding the valuation mode constant.
Table 4
WTA and WTP means and standard errors by anchor type.
Anchor type WTA WTP
Low anchor High anchor Low anchor High anchor
Group A Group B Group A Group B Group A Group B Group A Group B
Baseline 4.61 4.98 5.42 5.58 1.64 1.34 1.68 1.54
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.45) (0.41) (0.50) (0.44) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25)
Implausible price 5.29 5.55 1.48 1.58
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.40) (0.43) (0.28) (0.29)
Similar good 4.74 4.94 1.50 1.56
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.41) (0.43) (0.25) (0.22)
Dissimilar good 4.81 4.76 1.14 1.27
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.45) (0.48) (0.18) (0.20)
Incentivized 4.86 5.51 1.39 1.57
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.46) (0.49) (0.17) (0.20)
Passive number search 4.78 5.67 1.43 1.54
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.38) (0.42) (0.24) (0.26)
Passive price search 4.94 5.48 1.21 1.44
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.42) (0.44) (0.16) (0.22)
Active number search 5.26 5.93 1.90 1.81
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.46) (0.47) (0.34) (0.30)
Active price search 4.83 5.48 1.47 1.57
(WTA 54 observations; WTP 60 observations) (0.41) (0.40) (0.20) (0.22)
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
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cantly different from low-anchor ones (z = 0.349, p = 0.727). It should be borne in mind that our Wilcoxon tests are less
powerful when comparisons involve ‘no lab anchor’ valuations, because of the greater noise in those data. Nevertheless,
our ﬁndings give some indication that the tendency for WTA valuations to be pulled up by high anchors may be stronger
than the tendency for them to be pulled down by low ones – an asymmetry that has also been observed for shaping effects,
and that is consistent with bad-deal aversion (Isoni et al., 2011).
In the buying context, mean low-anchor and high-anchor WTP (£1.45 and £1.56) both lie within the range of low anchor
values, implying that there was little scope for WTP to be pulled down by low anchors, and hence that the observed anchor-
ing effect was primarily due to the effect of high anchors. ‘No lab anchor’ WTP valuations are not signiﬁcantly different either
from high-anchor valuations (z = 0.475, p = 0.635) or from low-anchor ones (z = 0.007, p = 0.995) In the light of these high
p-values, the apparently surprising observation that ‘no lab anchor’ valuations have a higher mean (£1.62) than high-anchor
valuations may reasonably be attributed to sampling error.
Table 3 reports mean WTA and WTP valuations for high and low anchors, broken down by commodity but aggregated
across anchor types. (We do not report ‘no lab anchor’ valuations at this level of disaggregation because sample sizes are
small. For each commodity, there are only 18 observations of ‘no lab anchor’ WTA and only 20 of ‘no lab anchor’ WTP.)
Standard errors are calculated using subjects as units of observation. For each commodity and for each valuation mode,
the high-anchor mean is greater than the low-anchor mean, suggesting that anchoring effects are robust across different
commodities.
Table 4 reports mean WTA and WTP valuations for high and low anchors, broken down by anchor type but aggregated
across commodities. Again, standard errors are calculated at the subject level. Fig. 1 shows box plots of WTA and WTP, using
the same disaggregations. In the selling context, mean high-anchor WTA is higher than mean low-anchor WTA for eight of
the nine anchor types (the exception being ‘dissimilar good’). In the buying context, mean high-anchor WTP is higher than
mean low-anchor WTP for eight of the nine anchor types (the exception being ‘active number search’).
Unsurprisingly, WTA is consistently higher than WTP. Averaging over all commodities, all anchor types and all anchor
values, WTA is £5.16 and WTP is £1.51. In interpreting these data, we must allow for the fact that £0.50 of the difference
between our WTA and WTP measures is attributable to our elicitation procedure and accounting conventions (see footnote
2). However, after the measures have been made comparable by subtracting £0.25 from WTA and adding £0.25 to WTP, the
ratio of WTA to WTP is 2.8, and the difference between the two is strongly signiﬁcant (z = 10.302, p < 0.001). This ﬁnding
agrees with many previous ﬁndings of WTA–WTP disparities (e.g., Coursey, Hovis, & Schulze, 1987; Horowitz & McConnell,
2002).
5.2. Regression analysis
Table 4 reports how valuations are affected by each anchor type when regressions are run to verify their effects.3 In each
regression equation, the anchor type is ﬁxed and the dependent variable is either WTA or WTP. Each of the reported coefﬁcients3 An online appendix contains the full regression results.
Fig. 1. Willingness to accept (WTA) and to pay (WTP) for different anchor types.
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regression that also contained a period variable (between 1 and 11) to pick up any trends in responses over the course of the
experiment, and ﬁxed effects controlling for the commodity type. There was no signiﬁcant trend in any of the WTA regressions.
In a few of the WTP regressions, there was a signiﬁcant downward trend in valuations. We tried adding a variable to pick up
interaction between ‘anchor value’ and ‘period’, but this was not signiﬁcant for either WTA or WTP.
The results reported in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 control for the potential non-independence of observations at the
subject level by employing OLS regressions with error clustering. The results of using an alternative method of control, that
of random effects regressions, is reported in the third and fourth columns.4 The results of the two sets of regressions are very
similar. In the rest of this section, we will refer to the OLS results.4 As a further robustness check, to allow for the truncation of reported valuations at £12, we also used Tobit regressions with cluster with the upper bound
£12. Unsurprisingly, given the very small number of valuations above this bound (see footnote 2), the results of these regressions are in line with the others.
Table 5
Anchor type coefﬁcients in regressions on WTA and WTP.
Anchor type OLS with error clustering Random effects
WTA WTP WTA WTP
Baseline 0.764⁄⁄⁄ 0.078 0.675⁄⁄⁄ 0.093
(WTA 216 observations; WTP 240 observations) (0.18) (0.067) (0.176) (0.067)
Implausible price 0.284 0.073 0.292 0.09
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.283) (0.081) (0.275) (0.081)
Similar good 0.188 0.05 0.231 0.07
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.326) (0.103) (0.308) (0.092)
Dissimilar good 0.048 0.129 0.048 0.126⁄
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.29) (0.08) (0.283) (0.072)
Incentivized 0.685⁄⁄ 0.163 0.676⁄⁄ 0.188⁄
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.297) (0.113) (0.288) (0.107)
Passive number search 0.933⁄⁄⁄ 0.058 0.916⁄⁄⁄ 0.092
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.197) (0.095) (0.179) (0.085)
Passive price search 0.590⁄ 0.253⁄ 0.577⁄ 0.257⁄
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.34) (0.142) (0.341) (0.135)
Active number search 0.711⁄⁄⁄ 0 0.647⁄⁄⁄ 0.007
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.251) (0.185) (0.242) (0.184)
Active price search 0.745⁄⁄ 0.187⁄⁄ 0.721⁄⁄⁄ 0.150⁄⁄
(WTA 108 observations; WTP 120 observations) (0.29) (0.086) (0.257) (0.075)
Note: Each coefﬁcient is the ‘anchor type’ dummy coefﬁcient in a regression controlling also for period and commodity type. Each dummy is equal to 1 when
there is a high anchor, 0 with a low anchor. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Clusters or random effects control for non-independence of
observations at the subject level. ⁄ = p < 0.1, ⁄⁄ = p < 0.05 and ⁄⁄⁄ = p < 0.01.
30 R. Sugden et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013) 21–31In the selling context, there is clear evidence of an anchoring effect for the baseline anchor (t = 4.24, p < 0.001). Using the
high anchor value rather than the low one increases WTA by £0.76 (approximately 15 per cent of the overall mean WTA). As
explained in Section 4.2, ﬁve of the anchor types can be interpreted as adding some additional element of engagement to the
baseline task. The anchoring effect is statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10 per cent level in all of these cases (‘incentivized’
t = 2.31, p = 0.025; ‘passive number search’ t = 4.74, p < 0.001; ‘passive price search’ t = 1.74, p = 0.088; ‘active number search’
t = 2.83, p = 0.007; ‘active price search’ t = 2.57, p = 0.013). However, there is no evidence that engagement systematically in-
creases (or decreases) the size of the anchoring effect relative to the baseline case. There is no signiﬁcant anchoring effect
when anchor values are implausible, or when the anchor commodity is not the same as the trading commodity.
Result 1: In the selling context, anchors are effective in distorting behaviour if and only if the anchor takes the form of a plausible
price for the trading commodity.
In the buying context, there is no signiﬁcant anchoring effect in the baseline case. Given this result, it is unsurprising that
there is also no signiﬁcant effect when anchor values are implausible or when the anchor and trading commodities are dif-
ferent. The only anchor type that is signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level is ‘active price search’ (t = 2.18, p = 0.033). In this case,
using the high anchor value rather than the low one increases WTP by £0.19 (approximately 12 per cent of the overall mean
WTP). ‘Passive price search’ is signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level (t = 1.79, p = 0.079). One possible interpretation of these
results is that there are anchoring effects for WTP when the degree of engagement with anchor values is sufﬁciently great.
An alternative interpretation is that the crucial property of ‘price search’ is not so much engagement by the subject in the
construction of the anchor, as that the anchor value is framed as the lowest of an array of prices. Since ‘lowest’ is a salient
feature of price for buyers, this framing draws attention to the anchor value as a price, and so is particularly likely to prime
conversational norms and/or bad-deal aversion. But however one interprets the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for ‘active price
search’, it is clear that anchoring effects are weaker for WTP than for WTA.
Result 2: Anchors are less effective in the buying context than in the selling context. There is some evidence that, in the buying
context, anchoring effects occur when subjects are engaged with the construction of the anchor value and when that value is
framed as a price of the trading commodity.
6. Discussion and conclusion
We conclude that anchoring effects can affect individual behaviour in incentivized tasks involving familiar consumer
goods, but that not all anchors are effective.
For some readers, the most striking feature of our results may be that the anchoring effects we ﬁnd are relatively small.
They are much smaller, for example, than those reported by Ariely et al. (2003); and, as a glance at Fig. 1 shows, valuation
disparities due to anchoring are far smaller than disparities between WTA and WTP. In this respect, however, our results are
not outliers: as noted in Section 1, several comparable studies have found anchoring effects to be small or even non-existent.
But it should be remembered that our experiment was designed to allow controlled investigations of the relative effective-
ness of different types of anchor and of the relative effectiveness of anchors in selling and buying contexts – not of the
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ing questions and its own anchor. It would not be surprising if this feature of our design had some tendency to dampen the
speciﬁc effects of individual anchors. Further, as explained in Section 3.1, our method of eliciting valuations through binary
choices is likely to induce weaker anchoring effects than the more usual (but, we have argued, less externally valid) method
of open-ended questions. But these considerations do not affect the validity of comparisons across anchor types and across
valuation modes.
The sharpest result of our experiment is that anchoring effects are stronger in the context of selling than in the context of
buying. This result is consistent with the tentative ﬁnding of Fudenberg et al. (2012). One important implication of this result
is that experiments that study anchoring effects in selling contexts are likely to overstate the signiﬁcance of such effects in
retail markets.
A second general ﬁnding is that anchoring effects are strongest when the anchor value is framed as a plausible price for
the good for which the individual is a potential buyer or seller. In an incentivized design investigating trading decisions
about familiar consumer products, we found no evidence of the ‘basic’ anchoring effects that have been observed for various
kinds of non-economic judgements, and only weak evidence that the strength of anchoring effects is inﬂuenced by the extent
of individuals’ engagement with the process by which arbitrary anchor values are constructed. This suggests that, in eco-
nomic contexts, anchoring effects work primarily by suggesting that the (plausible) prices that are presented as anchors
are in some way reasonable or normal, despite their arbitrariness. The implication is that consumers’ preferences are some-
what less labile than the psychological literature might suggest. Nevertheless, that still leaves plenty of scope for ﬁrms to try
to manipulate consumers’ perceptions of reasonable prices.
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